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Synopsis  
The legal treatment of disability affairs carries in itself an inherent contradiction due to the 
nature of modern society and free-market economy. On the one hand both the historically 
developed notions of essentialism and on the other the particular-functional definition of 
manhood drawing its roots from the established democratic order and market economics are 
present simultaneously. However, within the current order of things there is an unbridgeable 
divide between them. Nevertheless, with the progression of time there is a slow gradual shift 
discernible away from the functional definition with the parallel strengthening of the 
essentialist approach. This shift is further exaggerated by the more widespread acceptance of 
the rights of self-determination and the provision of opportunities for the disabled, the 
emergence of social self-determination in case of a population subgroup living under special 
conditions. For the proper interpretation of the currents in the evolution of legal treatment of 
disabled people it would be indispensable to institute a proper social-discourse analysis, 
which, however, exceeds in scope its narrowly defined task. 
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Introduction 
In the legal treatment of the condition of people living with disabilities we can find an 
inherent contradiction.  While as a result of social progress the individual is viewed as a 
distinct and unique being, however, its definition does not extend beyond a social-utilitarian 
approach. Therefore, the legal treatment of disabilities does not aim to support the realization 
of the fullness of life for all individuals it merely delineates those segments that have direct 
relevance to the proper functioning of society. From a legal point of view the entire issue of 
disability affairs is characterized by the dichotomy between man as an individual for its own 
ends and self-realization and as a socially relevant and valuable building block of society. 
The ontological basis of this duality is found in modern society and free-market economy 
which for Marx1 meant the differentiation between the use-value and value of a commodity. 
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 Karl Marx (1948): A tőke (Capital). Volume 1. Budapest, Szikra, pp. 43–159. 
Use-value is the actual utility of a thing whereas value in itself is some kind of quantitative 
property, the amount of labour required for its reproduction, which only gains its true 
importance when put into actual use in the social organism. In brief, the commodity both as a 
quality and as a quality is present. The same duality appears in Georg Simmel as the contrast 
between hypothetical value and the individuality of objects.2 He arrives at the notion that 
money, as measure of value, terminates uniqueness.3 Thus, what has utility for the whole 
society in its uniqueness is valuable only the particular individual. As long as quantity is 
socially important, quality tends to be irrelevant and only manifests any measure of 
importance if combined with quantity that is with value or social utility. 
Certainly it is not insinuated that prior to the advent of capitalism society did not extricate 
itself of those elements that had no utility or could not be integrated into its fabric.4 However, 
it was with the dawn of pluralistic democracy and modern-day capitalism that the now 
prevalent utilitarian approach to social organization and the concomitant social welfare and 
public health services, which ingrained in daily discourse the categories of socially valuable 
and useless; the distinction between those worthy and unworthy to receive care. The entire 
conceptual understanding of disability affairs, its institutional system and necessarily its 
legal treatment is based on the division between valuable and redundant individuals, 
individuals fulfilling socially useful functions, but sacrificing their independence and the 
self-serving type, which nevertheless demonstrates a more multifaceted characteristics.  
The examination of the legal treatment of people living with disabilities must exceed the mere 
enumeration of the pertaining laws and regulations. All the progress achieved in this area is 
the result of a continuous struggle and compromise among the groups involved, which often 
have rather diverse narrow interests. In this struggle, based on the values of the bourgeois-
democratic tradition here the impulse for selfless help, these rights are in constant conflict 
with the interests of a multitude of actors in the sense that in a given particular situation what 
are assumed to be the most advantageous or at least acceptable requirements for social 
integration from the viewpoint of a group. Or the type of disability and to what measure it 
should be remedied to make the disabled person in a functional sense a valuable member of 
society.  It is inescapable not to have a divergence between the attributes of people living with 
disabilities as human beings and the assumed criteria for social utility. Social discourse i.e. 
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Foucault’s discourse theory5 settles to what extent should be the disabled helped to either 
attain their full human potential or contribute positively to the fulfilment of actual social 
needs as a consequence of the support received. Therefore, in addition to the detailed listing 
of the attained rights, the analysis of the legal framework of the decision-making 
mechanism pertaining to disability affairs is also necessary as it may shed light on the 
opportunities the disabled may have not only to be subjects of but genuine contributors 
to the decisions directly affecting them. As part of the proposed study there should be a 
discourse analysis examining the topics that the various involved parties employ during the 
various stages of the disability related legislative processes, e.g. the public parliamentary and 
media debate on the National Programme of Disability Affairs; however, the detailed 
treatment of this topic far exceeds the scope of the current paper. 
 
The root problem of the legal treatment of disability affairs 
In the legal treatment of the condition of people living with disabilities one primary problem 
needs to be overcome by every legislative body. On the one side in western civilization6 the 
developing individualistic value system and the notion of equality emerging from the old 
system feudal privileges, and the ideal of complete equally as enumerated in the Declaration 
of Independence and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen consider 
individuals strictly qualitatively or view man in an essentialist model. On the other the profit-
oriented logic of capitalism favours a functionalist criterion, whereby the individual must 
serve as a productive member of society, meaning he should actively contribute to or at least 
not hinder the smooth functioning of the profit driven social-economic-political system; this is 
seen as the utilitarian or functionalist view of man. The area of disabilities may be one of 
the major flashpoints between the ideologically motivated and profit oriented philosophies; 
the disabled are entitled to the same rights as the non-disabled members of society, however, 
their integration into mainstream society due to their presumed “uselessness” requires the 
outlay of substantial social and material resources. The principle of equality demands that any 
society should attempt to remedy the outstanding disadvantages, but it does not necessarily 
mean that it attempts to transform disabled people into socially valuable members for its own 
benefit. As we lack any semblance of an eternal human essence what should be applied to all 
members of society is the opportunity of self-realization, though personal aspirations may go 
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far beyond what is considered as socially conducive in a particular society. Compensation for 
disadvantages suffered must come with the provision of opportunities to live a full life, which 
necessarily requires integration, in other words, in any age in any given society “useful” 
functions must be found for the disabled, though by doing so the essentialist model may be 
compromised.  
The approach to equal treatment and equal opportunities must necessarily entail that in a 
viable social setting the peculiar conditions of the disabled are only remedied with a 
functional goal in mind, with results that are beneficial to the entire community. However, 
such an approach naturally sacrifices a measure of the ideals and expectations the disabled 
may have concerning what perfect human life may entail theoretically. 
When examining the legal treatment of this area it is apparent that only a general framework 
system is present, the wording of the particular laws and regulations is broad enough to be 
applicable to each individual case. Still, the logic behind such legislation is not simply its 
wide applicability, but also its usefulness as a tool for the realization of the profit-oriented 
philosophy of capitalism. The dreams, expectation, and desires, though can be viewed as 
social constructs, nevertheless constitute some form human essence as a concrete historical 
totality, which often cannot fit into functionalist utilitarian benefit-oriented systems. There is 
a simultaneous need to provide accessibility to the disabled, as they are full-fledged human 
beings, but also to expend resources for such goals only when the attendant benefits are 
observable for the entire social organism. The primary goal of the legal treatment of 
disabilities is the simultaneous attainment of inherent human fullness and completeness 
valuable for the capitalist system. Such duality necessarily leads to theoretical declarations of 
equality for the disabled, nevertheless, in practice a wide array of obstacles appears as soon as 
facing assumedly “worthless” cases or disabilities, which cannot be remedied through 
integration. In practice the target is not to help the disabled to achieve their inherent self-
actualization, but only the attainment of a functionalist or integrated human existence. Human 
beings as self-defined measures of value, essentialism, and as socially valuable units, 
utilitarianism or functionalism, do not necessarily overlap; furthermore, due to the limited 
amount of available resources the latter becomes more dominant in normal practise. Any 
social endeavour beyond this narrow scope is viewed as untenable. The criteria for social 
“utility” are defined through a dialogue among the various actors involved. The four primary 
factors characterizing this discourse are 1. basic human rights (core values); 2. the profit-
driven nature of capitalism (the reinvestment of the highest possible share of profits); 3. the 
basic attitude of individuals toward the profit-driven lifestyle for possession and gain, and 4. 
“dysfunctional” values and demands which may appear during the operation of the system 
and considered to be a hindrance to its operation. Society handles the “utilitarian” value of 
disabilities by having various agents (individuals, groups, expert organizations etc.) arguing 
their case and engaging in a discourse according to their specific values and agendas.  
 
The complexity of this duality is well-represented in Act XXVI of 1998 on the rights and 
safeguarding of equal opportunities of disabled persons, which in Article 4 defines a person 
living with disabilities for the purposes of this Act as someone who does not at all or only 
partially possesses his sense organs, especially sight, hearing, motor skills, and mental 
abilities. Furthermore, he may be debilitated in his communication skills, which results in an 
enduring disadvantage in his social interactions and active participation in social life.   
The wording of the act insinuates that exclusion from social life, baring active participation, is 
a disadvantage affecting the individual. Thus, the impression is made that people living with 
disabilities can make the decision whether the lack of active participation is indeed 
disadvantageous for them and if so since when and to what measure. With the 2007 
amendment of the act on disabilities the valid criticism was made that the President of the 
Republic in the previously adopted legislation, while acknowledging its merits, considered the 
2010 and subsequently the 2013 final deadline for the realization of the target of the act as too 
distant and the resources to be allocated for it inadequate and proposed a shorter deadline and 
higher budget outlays. It seems that there is a persistent dichotomy between the listed goals 
and the available resources; however, it is also apparent that the definition of what the targets 
should be, which should be necessarily beneficial on the societal level and are adjusted to the 
actual possibilities present, is arrived at as the outcome of a discourse between the Parliament, 
and the government on one pole and the President of the Republic on the other. Unfortunately 
the affected disabled people by and large seem to be excluded from the process. With the 
adoption of Act LXII of 2013 the pertinent article defines more clearly the rights of people 
living with disabilities and also the important terms employed are better enumerated. 
 
Therefore, one of the central questions of every study should be the analysis of the interaction 
between the disabled and their representative advocacy groups and between such 
organizations and the public or state decision-making bodies. The major issue is to what 
measure the disabled have the legal and institutional means and opportunities to realize 
their own goals. It must be emphasized that the assumed self-interests are also social 
constructs, which are generated by society itself, which is both democratic and capitalistic, 
thus any aspirations necessarily also trace their roots to capitalism. There are two major 
possible points of contention between the self-interests and the publicly recognized legitimate 
expectations. First when the public expense for remedying the special conditions of the 
disabled is deemed excessive; in the negotiation process concerning the price the affected are 
left out completely or are involved in a limited fashion. Second when the socially generated 
demands of the disabled run contrary to social utility. Regrettably, this latter conflict is 
impossible to resolve.  The previously mentioned general human needs from an analytical 
angle can be actualized as the disabled very own requirement; concurrently the question of 
inquiry should be whether this own demand is able to articulate itself and if so with what 
chances of conversion into actual legislation or regulations. 
Consequently the legal treatment of disability affairs in Hungary has three main vantage 
points: 
1. the opportunities the current treatment of disability affairs offers  to the disabled to become 
“active members in social life” or the steps taken to offer equal opportunities with the non-
disabled to become valuable members of society, which are the essential points of legal rights 
concerning disabilities; 
2. the type of conflicts (advocacy groups, aims, and divergent values), which are clearly 
discernible in the current laws and regulations in place (these form the subject of a separate 
study, here a mere few essential points are mentioned); 
3. the opportunities the disabled have for self-organization and whether these bodies are able 
to and to what extent articulate and realize their own agendas; the level of involvement they 
demonstrate in decision-making or its delegation to other bodies, the system of demand 
articulation and its legal treatment.7 
 
 
The legal treatment of disability rights 
International treaties and conventions 
 
Among international treaties the primary legal foundation of disability affairs rests on the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Optional Protocol8, which was 
adopted by the UN General Assembly on 13 December 2006 in New York and entered into 
Hungarian law as Act XCII of 2007.    
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The Convention solves with ingenious simplicity the contradiction between universal 
human rights (essentialism) and social usefulness (utilitarianism, functionalism) when it 
states in the Preamble that: “h) Recognizing also that discrimination against any person on 
the basis of disability is a violation of the inherent dignity and worth of the human person”. 
At the same place it is stated that “e) Recognizing that disability is an evolving concept and 
that disability results from the interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal 
and environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective participation in society on an 
equal basis with others;” thus approaching disabilities from functionalist angle. 
However, at first it is declared that  
“a) Recalling the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations which recognize 
the inherent dignity and worth and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family as the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, 
b) Recognizing that the United Nations, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in 
the International Covenants on Human Rights, has proclaimed and agreed that everyone is 
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind,” which 
is an essentialist interpretation of human rights. 
 
In the already mentioned Paragraph h) of the Preamble disabilities are linked with the 
“inherent dignity and worth of the human person” while at the same they are also seen as 
barriers that hinder full and effective participation in society. Unless the same opportunities 
are extended for the disabled for participation in the life of societies or the persisting 
disadvantages are not remedied, thus discrimination based on disabilities endures then the 
“inherent dignity and worth of the human person” is violated. The rectification of the 
condition stemming from disabilities therefore is to ensure human dignity and value. As a 
consequence one’s “inherent dignity and worth of the human person” acquires a functionalist 
meaning, which is realized with one’s “full and effective participation in society on an equal 
basis with others”. By balancing the essentialist and functionalist approaches makes irrelevant 
any claims in disability affairs which are not indispensable preconditions for participation in 
the life of society. 
 
Achievements of European Community Law   
Council Directive 2000/78/EC about equal treatment 
 
Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 - Establishing a general framework for 
equal treatment in employment and occupation in its Preamble sets down the principles for the 
treatment of disabled people: 
Paragraph 6: “recognizes the importance of combating every form of discrimination, 
including the need to take appropriate action for the social and economic integration of 
elderly and disabled people.” 
Paragraphs 11-12: “Discrimination based on [...] disability [...] may undermine the 
achievement of [...] the attainment of a high level of employment and social protection, 
raising the standard of living and the quality of life, economic and social cohesion and 
solidarity, and the free movement of persons.” 
Paragraph 16: “The provision of measures to accommodate the needs of disabled people [...] 
plays an important role in combating discrimination on grounds of disability.” 
Paragraph 20: “[...] effective and practical measures to adapt the workplace to the disability, 
for example adapting premises and equipment, patterns of working time, the distribution of 
tasks or the provision of training or integration resources.” 
Paragraph 23: “In very limited circumstances, a difference of treatment may be justified 
where a characteristic related to [...] disability constitutes a genuine and determining 
occupational requirement, when the objective is legitimate and requirement is proportionate.” 
Paragraph 26: “The prohibition of discrimination should be without prejudice to the 
maintenance or adoption of measures intended to prevent or compensate for disadvantages 
suffered by a group of persons of [...] a disability [...] and such measures may permit 
organisations of persons of a [...] disability [...] where their main object is the promotion of 
special needs of those persons.” 
Paragraph 27: “In its Recommendation 86/379/EEK of 24 July 1986 [...] the Council 
established a guideline framework setting out examples of positive action to promote the 
employment and training of disabled people [...] in its Resolution of 17 June 1999 [...] 
affirmed the importance of giving specific attention inter alia to recruitment, retention, 
training and lifelong learning with regard to disabled persons.” 
Paragraph 29: “Persons who have been subject to discrimination based on [...] disability [...] 
should have adequate means of legal protection. To provide a more effective level of 
protection, association or legal entities should also be empowered to engage in proceedings 
[...].” 
Paragraph 31: “The burden of proof must shift back to the respondent when evidence of [...] 
discrimination is brought.” 
The text aims to negate the effects of discrimination in employment to promote social and 
economic integration. Furthermore, it calls for a high level of social protection, the elevation 
of standard of living, improvement of quality of life, economic and social cohesion and 
solidarity with exclusion to be averted even outside the workplace, as well as the provision of 
freedom of movement. Such wide array of complexity covers every facet of social life and is 
in complete accord with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and 
Optional Protocol adopted by the General Assembly on 13 December 2006 in New York and 
entered into Hungarian law as Act XCII of 2007, which defines discrimination based on 
disability as offense against the “inherent dignity and worth of the human person.” 
Council Directive 2000/78/EC introduces the divergence between the terms direct and indirect 
discrimination in Article 2 Paragraph 2 sections a) and b) where it states that direct 
discrimination “shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably than 
another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation [...]”; whereas indirect 
discrimination “shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral, provision, criterion or 
practice would put persons having a particular [...] disability [...] at a particular disadvantage 
compared with other persons.”  
Article 5 specifically mentions protection against unfair treatment of disabled people to 
“guarantee compliance with the principle of equal treatment in relation to persons with 
disabilities [...] This means that employers shall take appropriate measures, where needed in a 
particular case, to enable a person with a disability to have access to, participate in, or 
advance in employment, or to undergo training, unless such measures would impose a 
disproportionate burden on the employer. This burden shall not be disproportionate when it is 
sufficiently remedied by measures existing within the framework of the disability policy of 
the Member State concerned.” At first glance the text seems reasonable as it requires from 
employers taking reasonable and appropriate measures, while simultaneously exempting them 
if such measures would impose disproportionate burden on them. The main point of 
contention is not the appropriate-disproportionate paradigm, rather the specific interests and 
bargaining positions of the various actors involved in its formulation. Naturally, it is in the 
employers’ interests to minimize their costs and burdens, while employees aim to maximize 
their remuneration and benefits. By stripping away the euphemistic formulas we are left with 
the basic disagreement between labour and employers over profit-sharing or what portion of 
revenue above the overhead should be distributed among the employees. Obviously the 
position of the employers in this intercourse is much stronger than that of labour. The 
emphasis on appropriate measures merely serves to disguise the essential cleavage between 
labour and capital. The referrence to the disability policies of the concerned Member States 
rests on the tenet of the state’s neutrality, whereby it appears in the dialogue process 
seemingly as an equal partner with the involved parties; however, the state’s bargaining 
position far exceeds both of labour’s and capital’s.  
To somewhat offset this, Paragraph 26 of the Preamble declares that disabled people may 
organize themselves, thus fulfilling in theory the principle of equality. Nevertheless it does 
not elaborate on the actual power relations, from which it is prevented by the fear of 
nullifying the basic legal principles of modern societies based on free-market capitalism. 
For settling disputes the Directive mentions in Article 13 the process of the “dialogue between 
social partners.” The text by using the term “social” admits the existence of conflicting sides, 
but it fails to elaborate on what methods it deems fit to qualify to be applied during this 
“dialogue.” In Paragraph 1 it mentions appropriate workplace practices including strike action 
while in Paragraph 2 it proposes the conclusion of agreements at the appropriate levels. In 
Paragraph 14 it emphasizes dialogue with appropriate non-governmental organizations, 
thereby including in the fight against discrimination such advocacy groups which have 
legitimate interests; naturally, the term legitimate is rather difficult to define. 
 
In general the Council Directive on equal treatment unequivocally fulfils the formal criteria 
for equality and recommends making actual decisions in the framework of social dialogues 
through the negotiation of all involved sides, while noting their uneven bargaining powers.  
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